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Costs and Benefits of Public Employee
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Chapter 2
Estimating State and Local Government
Pension and Retiree Health Care Liabilities
Stephen T. McElhaney
Recently concern has been raised about public sector unfunded retiree
liabilities. Some observers declare a looming crisis in public pension and
retiree health-care funding (Pew 2007). Others charge that this crisis is
even worse than it might appear, because public sector retirement system
liabilities are not computed using appropriate assumptions and methods
(Ennis 2007; Gold and Latter 2009). Here we do not resolve the question of
whether such a crisis exists. But because public debate relies, at least in part,
on the numbers being published in public financial reports, it is important
to review the basis of these calculations as a measure of their credibility. This
chapter examines the principles under which the calculations of unfunded
liability are derived. Our attention focuses on general actuarial principles
as set forth in Actuarial Standards of Practice; accounting principles for
retiree benefit plans in the private sector; accounting principles for retiree
benefit plans in the public sector; comments regarding the differences
between private- and public-sector financial reporting; and estimates of the
overall magnitude of public sector retiree liabilities.
Measurement issues
The primary guidance given to actuaries with respect to measuring
retirement-related liabilities, both in the public and private sectors, is pro-
vided by the Actuarial Standards Board (ASB) in its Actuarial Standard
of Practice (ASOP) No. 4, entitled Measuring Pension Obligations and Deter-
mining Pension Plan Costs or Contributions (ASB 2007). Within the scope of
ASOP No. 4, paragraph 1.2.a is the measurement of pension obligations,
including ‘determinations of funded status, assessments of solvency upon
plan termination, and measurements for use in cost or contribution deter-
minations’ (ASB 2007). Section 2.1 of that circular defines the term ‘Actu-
arial Accrued Liability,’ which is used almost universally for communicating
funded status of public sector retirement programs. A plan’s Actuarial
Accrued Liability (AAL) is dependent upon the particular actuarial cost
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method and is defined as the ‘portion of the actuarial present value of
projected benefits . . . not provided for by future normal costs’ (ASB 2007).
Section 3.11 of ASOP No. 4 gives guidance with respect to selection of an
actuarial cost method. Actuarial cost methods are generally chosen to be
consistent with the funding objectives of the pension fund and/or the spon-
soring organization. Specific actuarial cost methods include the Entry Age
Normal Method, the Projected Unit Credit Method, the Traditional Unit
Credit Method, Frozen Initial Liability Method, the Attained Age Normal
Method, and the Aggregate Method as well as variations of these methods.
Of these methods, only the Entry Age Normal Method, the Projected Unit
Credit Method, and the Traditional Unit Credit Method directly calculate
an Actuarial Accrued Liability at each actuarial valuation date. For the
Frozen Initial Liability Method and the Attained Age Normal Method, an
Actuarial Accrued Liability is calculated at one particular actuarial valua-
tion date and not updated at future dates except as to amortize such liability
to the extent funded by contributions to the plan. The Aggregate Method
does not determine any Accrued Liability, and plans that use the Aggregate
Method therefore can give the illusion of being 100 percent funded at
all times. The methods that determine Actuarial Accrued Liability at each
valuation date are sometimes called ‘immediate gain methods,’ while the
methods that do not directly determine Actuarial Accrued Liability at each
valuation date are sometimes called ‘spread gain methods.’
ASOP No. 4 provides very broad guidance with respect to selection of
a specific actuarial cost method. Each of the specific methods listed in
the earlier paragraph would probably meet the very broad guidelines of
ASOP No. 4 for almost any public sector retirement program. The circular
does not provide guidance with respect to actuarial assumptions except to
refer to ASOP No. 27—Selection of Economic Assumptions for Measuring Pension
Obligations (ASB 2005a), and ASOP No. 35—Selection of Demographic and
Other Noneconomic Assumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations (ASB 2005b).
The first of these, ASOP No. 27, is especially important in assessing
governmental retiree liabilities, since it provides guidance with respect to
selection of the discount rate used for valuing liabilities. In most instances,
the selection of discount rate has more influence on the magnitude of
the calculated liability than any other single assumption. Under this doc-
ument, the discount rate should be selected based upon the expected long-
term investment return, unless the specific purpose of the measurement
should be based upon a different assumption. ASOP No. 27 suggests that
the actuary’s determination of the investment return assumption should
consider factors which include the plan’s investment policy, investment
volatility, manager performance, and cash flow timing. In addition, ASOP
No. 27 states that the determination of economic assumptions includes
development of a best-estimate range, rather than a single result, and that
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the actuary should select the assumptions from within this range. For an
investment return assumption where the investment policy includes poten-
tially volatile assets such as equities, such a best-estimate range may span 200
basis points or more. Two actuaries analyzing the same data could reach
substantially different conclusions with respect to choice of an investment
return assumption, resulting in substantially different measurements of
plan funded status.
ASOP No. 35 provides guidance with respect to demographic assump-
tions such as turnover, retirement, disability, and mortality. While selection
of unreasonable demographic assumptions can have a material effect on
the magnitude of actuarial liabilities, for purposes of this chapter, it has
been assumed that such assumptions have been selected reasonably with
appropriate reference to the experience of the plan. (This comment also
applies to other economic actuarial assumptions covered by ASOP No. 27
such as future salary growth and inflation.)
A different document, ASOP No. 6—Measuring Retiree Group Obligations
(ASB 2001), provides guidance with respect to selection of assumptions
which are unique to non-pension benefits such as retiree health care and
retiree life insurance. For retiree heath care, these assumptions include
assumed rate of health-care claims and future trend rates. As with ASOP
No. 35, it is assumed that such assumptions are selected reasonably.
To summarize, Actuarial Standards Board practices on measurement
issues with respect to unfunded retirement liabilities are quite broad. Dif-
ferent funds and different actuaries can and do reach different conclusions
regarding the magnitude of unfunded liabilities for retirement programs
that are essentially very similar.
Private sector measurement
For private sector organizations in the United States, measurement of
retirement liabilities is covered primarily by three accounting standards
issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB):
– Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 87: Employers’ Accounting for
Pensions (FASB 1985)
– Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 106: Employers’ Accounting
for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions (FASB 2004)
– Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 158: Employers’ Accounting for
Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans—an amendment of
FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R) (FASB 2006)
The standards to measure liabilities are described in FAS No. 87 and FAS
No. 106, while FAS No. 158 covers how such liabilities should be disclosed in
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financial statements. Among other requirements, FAS No. 87 and FAS No.
106 set the specific requirements with respect to selection of the actuarial
cost method and the discount rate. The actuarial cost method used is
the Projected Unit Credit Method for all plans. Further, the discount rate
should reflect the rates at which the obligations could be effectively settled.
FAS No. 87, paragraph 44 suggests that this rate could be based upon
current market rates of ‘high-quality fixed-income investments currently
available’ (FASB 1985).
The suggestion to use current market rates for fixed-income investments
anticipates a liability determination which is independent of the plan’s
expected return on investments. Implicit in this requirement is that such
assumption would be modified to current rates at each measurement of
the liability. As a rule, this type of measurement is known as a market value
liability. Discount rates using this approach will almost always be lower than
discount rates based upon the plan’s long-term investment return, and
therefore the actuarial liability calculated using a current market fixed-
income rate will generally be higher than an actuarial liability using an
investment return assumption.
Public sector measurement
For state and local public-sector organizations in the United States, mea-
surement of retiree liabilities is covered by two accounting standards issued
by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB):
– Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 27: Account-
ing for Pensions by State and Local Governmental Employers (GASB 1994)
– Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 45: Account-
ing and Financial Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other
Than Pensions (GASB 2004)
In contrast to the FASB requirements described earlier, these two state-
ments provide guidance with respect to selection of actuarial cost method
and discount rate. Any of the actuarial cost methods described for general
measurement purposes under ASOP No. 4 may be selected.
This flexibility may be desirable from the standpoint of long-term plan-
ning since the best fit of any cost method depends upon both the plan
structure and the financial requirements of the sponsoring organization.
However, this flexibility also makes it difficult to compare the funded
status of different organizations. Also, as has been noted previously, some
actuarial cost methods do not recalculate the actuarial accrued liability at
each actuarial valuation date, so that the reported funded status of various
retirement programs may not be fully comparative to the extent such
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comparability would be desirable. And finally the discount rate is based
upon each entity’s estimated long-term yield on investments.
For pension benefits under GASB No. 27, the discount rate is to be
the estimated long-term investment yield for the plan. For other post-
employment benefits (OPEB) under GASB No. 45 paragraph 13c, the
discount rate is to be the ‘estimated long-term investment yield on the
investments that are expected to be used to finance the payment of bene-
fits.’ The different language used in GASB No. 45 reflects the fact that most
pension benefits are funded within pension trust funds, whereas most other
post-employment benefits, including retiree health care, have historically
been paid for directly from current budgets on a pay-as-you-go basis. For
a plan operating in a pay-as-you-go environment, the long-term investment
return would be based upon returns on an employer’s general assets, which
are usually invested in very short-term fixed-income instruments. This rate
might actually be lower than the market bond rate derived for purposes of
FAS No. 87 or FAS No. 106. For OPEB that are fully funded through a trust,
the discount rate would be selected using the same principles as for funded
pension trust. For OPEB that are partially funded by a trust and partially
funded by employer assets, the discount rate is selected by blending the
appropriate fully funded and pay-as-you-go discount rates.
A result of the GASB discount rate requirements is that disclosed lia-
bilities for a particular OPEB plan will vary substantially, depending upon
whether the plan is funded or unfunded. Such a difference is expected to
cause many public sector plan sponsors to consider pre-funding of OPEB
obligations. It should be noted that pre-funding of OPEB obligations is not
common in the private sector due to two primary differences with respect
to funding between public and private sector employers:
– For private sector employers, the choice of discount rate under FAS
No. 106 is the same whether the plan is funded or unfunded.
– Most pre-funding instruments for private sector employers are not very
tax effective. Tax issues are not an issue for public sector employers
who are not subject to federal income tax.
The choice of discount rate is usually left to the plan sponsor. For public
retirement systems, the final decision is typically made by the retirement
board with input from the actuary. As with the flexibility in choosing the
actuarial cost method, this practice in adopting a discount rate causes
issues in having comparability of results among different retirement sys-
tems. Two systems with very similar asset allocation and investment polices
may choose different discount rates for reasons that may be unique to
the system or board. Also, there has been a tendency not to update the
discount rate due to the effect such a change would have on the reported
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amount of unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability. In some instances, systems
have changed to more aggressive investment polices in order to justify the
current discount rate, which means that the assumptions drive the asset
allocation policy instead of the other way around.
Comments regarding measurement differences
GASB’s approach to the discount rate for public plans has been criticized
on two fronts. First, the flexibility in selecting the discount rate based on
expected investment returns results in a wide range of such discount rates,
making it difficult to compare funding levels across various public organi-
zations. Second, there is a growing movement advocating that any deter-
mination of retiree liabilities should be market-related, perhaps following
FAS No. 87 and FAS No. 106. This position was taken by Ennis (2007) who
stated that allowing a plan sponsor to contribute less because the fund has
increased its risk causes public pension plans to appear cheaper than would
be dictated by proper economics. The author argues for using a settlement
rate similar to that used by private sector organizations that disclose under
FAS Nos. 87 and 106.
In addition, some members of the actuarial profession have advocated
that public-sector organizations should disclose retiree liabilities using a
market value approach independent of expected returns on plan assets
(Ruloff 2007; Gold and Latter 2009). The argument is that the market
value of liabilities is the only way to capture the intrinsic value of promised
benefits, so that reporting under any other methodology would mislead as
to benefits promised.
In 2006, GASB issued a white paper entitled Why Governmental Accounting
and Financial Reporting Is—And Should Be—Different (GASB 2006). Here the
organization stated that governments are accountable for resource use in
ways that differ from business enterprises. This is due in part to business
revenues being a ‘voluntary exchange between any willing buyer and seller’
whereas the revenue for government entities results from an ‘involuntary
payment of taxes.’ Therefore, the article contends, governmental account-
ing should address the need for ‘public accountability information by
helping stakeholders assess how public resources are acquired and used,
whether current resources were sufficient to meet current service costs
or whether some costs were shifted to future taxpayers and whether the
government’s ability to provide services deteriorated from the previous
year’ (GASB 2006: 1–2).
With respect to pension and other post-employment liabilities, GASB
(2006:13) argued that the accounting approach adopted for GASB Nos.
27 and 45 ‘explicitly harmonizes accounting with the actuarial funding
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characteristics of public pension plans’ (apparently meaning compliance
with the ASOPs described earlier in this chapter) and that the approach
‘was based on research studies conducted with financial statement users
at the time the pension standards were being developed.’ Also, GASB
noted that the approach makes it possible to charge ‘each period a level
percentage of normal costs’ which in turn ‘equitably spreads the burden of
an ongoing benefit program among different generations of taxpayers.’
At present, there remain substantial differences in how retiree liabilities
are reported for public and private organizations. In practice, the wide
range of acceptable practices and assumptions leads to problems of com-
parability from one public organization to another.
Magnitude of public sector liabilities
A number of recent studies have sought to document the value of pension
and retiree health care liabilities in the public sector. In 2007, the Pew
Center on the States issued a report covering public sector retirement ben-
efits promised by state governments (Pew 2007). This report estimated total
state pension liabilities of $2.35 trillion, of which $1.99 trillion was funded,
leaving a total unfunded liability of $361 billion. For OPEB, the total
liability was estimated at $381 billion, of which $11 billion was funded, leav-
ing an unfunded liability of $370 billion. Therefore, the states’ unfunded
liability for both pensions and OPEB was estimated as $731 billion.
This liability excludes promises made by local governmental entities and
most public school teachers. Local governmental liabilities are somewhat
difficult to estimate since there is no central filing and compilation of finan-
cial disclosures. Spiotto (2006) estimated that pension liabilities of state
and local governments could approach $700 billion to $1 trillion over
the next 10 years. Obviously this figure is a very rough estimate, and it
probably places the states’ share of the total unfunded liability at between
one-third to one-half of the total for all state and local governmental
organizations.
The OPEB liability has not yet been disclosed in annual financial state-
ments of most government units, and the first such disclosures occurred
in 2008. One estimate quoted in The New York Times valued the total
OPEB liability at $1 trillion (Freudenheim and Walsh 2005) This estimate
will likely turn out to be on the low side. More recently, Credit Suisse
issued a report entitled You Dropped a Bomb on Me, GASB. In this report,
OPEB liabilities for all US state and local governments were estimated at
$1.5 trillion (Zion and Varshney 2007). These figures are based upon the
current requirements reported under GASB Nos. 27 and 45. Accordingly,
the lack of uniformity in how individual liabilities are derived is substantial.
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Further, while most governmental plans use either Entry Age Normal or
Projected Unit Credit, there are many systems that use a method that
does not re-determine actuarial accrued liability at each valuation date.
For some of these, it may have been years since a determination has been
made. It also is not yet known which methods will be used for disclosure
of OPEB liabilities, although it is presumed that the great majority of the
calculations will use either Entry Age Normal or Projected Unit Credit.
Another consideration is that the discount rate is based upon a reasonable
range for the projected rate of investment return. Thus plans with similar
asset allocation and investment policies may have selected substantially dif-
ferent investment return assumptions. For many public sector retirement
systems the choice of discount rate is made by the system board of trustees,
so the actuary is required merely to state that the rate is reasonable, rather
than representing his best estimate. Even a difference of 0.5 percent in
the discount rate can lead to large differences in the Actuarial Accrued
Liability. Finally, for OPEB, it is not known how many of the plans will fully
fund benefits through trust funds. The number could substantially change
the overall actuarial liability since selection of discount rate depends on
the funding approach. Adding the liabilities for funded pension plans to
unfunded OPEB plans means adding liabilities determined with an average
discount rate of 8 percent to liabilities determined using discount rates in
the 4 percent to 5 percent range, creating an ‘apples and oranges’ situation.
Potential changes for public sector measurements
If the public sector were to adopt a market-value approach to measur-
ing retiree liabilities similar to the private sector, liabilities would surely
change substantially (see Gold and Latter [2009]). Pension liabilities would
certainly increase, but OPEB liabilities might decrease. The overall finan-
cial effect is difficult to measure, but for pension benefits, the reported
unfunded liabilities for some organizations could potentially double or
triple. GASB apparently has believed up to this point in time that the
current methodology provides the most relevant information to users of
public sector financial statements. But efforts can be made to make the
current disclosures more meaningful, particularly by making changes in
the selection of actuarial cost method and selection of the investment
return assumption.
For actuarial cost methods, the choices could be limited to those meth-
ods that directly determine an actuarial accrued liability at each valuation
date. This would restrict choice of actuarial cost method to Entry Age
Normal, Projected Unit Credit, or Traditional Unit Credit. Some of the
978–0–19–957334–9 Mitchell-Main-drv Mitchell (Typeset by SPi, Chennai) 27 of 343 July 21, 2009 20:23
2 / Estimating State and Local Government Pension 27
unfunded liabilities currently being reported under spread gain methods
may be misleading users as to the actual funded status of the plans.
The choice of the investment return assumption is too important to be
manipulated in order to obtain a desired result. For private sector calcula-
tions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prior
to 2008, the choice of the investment return assumption (as well as other
actuarial assumptions) had to be certified annually by the plan’s actuary as
being his or her best estimate. (Note that starting in 2008, funding rules
under ERISA have been changed to calculate liabilities in a manner similar
to the FASB market value approach.) It is logical that calculations for
financial disclosure of public sector retirement benefits should likewise be
based upon the actuary’s best estimate. In many instances the assumptions
adopted by a retirement system board will be identical to the actuary’s best
estimate, but in those instances where the actuary’s recommendation is not
adopted by the board, the public and users of financial statement informa-
tion should understand the effects of such a decision. This requirement
would also place more discipline on retirement system boards if they elect
to disregard the actuary’s recommendation.
Conclusion
The magnitude of unfunded liabilities by state and local governments
in the United States has great importance to taxpayers, bond holders,
and public employees. Consequently, the measurements of these liabilities
should be performed in a manner which provides the most useful infor-
mation possible to these groups. Determining the parameters for these
measurements will present challenges in the years ahead to those who
create the standards.
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